Partnership 2000

Earthquake Disaster Recovery

Notes Regarding Infrastructure Performance and Disaster Recovery, Kocaeli, Turkey and Chi-Chi, Taiwan Earthquakes August 17 and September 21, 1999.

Robert Anderson, CEG
California Energy Commission
(916) 654-3836
banderso@energy.state.ca.us

Introduction

The purpose of the site studies was to assess the performance of power plants electric and gas transmission and distribution systems after a major earthquake associated with faults with recognized counterparts in California. The field teams also made observations regarding the performance of other infrastructure systems and disaster recovery efforts as well.

This presentation is based upon experience gained during reconnaissance visits after the Kocaeli, Turkey and Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquakes, from September 2-19, 1999 and November 28 through December 4, 1999, respectively.

Benefits to California

Study the effects of a large San Andreas fault type earthquake in an urban setting on electric and gas utilities.

Study the effects of numerous large landslides (50,000 m³ +) and high ground accelerations on an electric transmission system with a low amount of redundancy and the potential to severely impact lives, businesses, and industries due to the interruption of electric power.

Compare observations and notes to research results from electric system seismic safety and reliability research and to observations and notes regarding California electric system performance during earthquakes.

Earthquake Size Comparison

Chi-Chi earthquake

• M_W 7.7 earthquake occurred on the Chelongpu fault 01:47 a.m. on 9/21/99.
• Slightly larger than the 1952 M_W 7.5 Kern County earthquake.
• The surface rupture of the fault has been traced for approximately 86 km.

Kocaeli earthquake

• M_W 7.4 earthquake occurred on the North Anatolian fault at 03:02 a.m on August 17, 1999.
• Larger than the Loma Prieta earthquake but slightly smaller than the Landers earthquake.
• The surface rupture of the fault totaled 120 km along four fault segments.

Comparison of Faults and Earthquakes

• The Chelongpu and Little Salmon faults are both thrust faults near plate boundaries.
• Capable of Magnitude M_W 7.7+ earthquakes.
• No Tsunami reported.
• The North Anatolian and San Andreas faults are both right lateral strike slip faults (transform faults).
• Both faults are at plate boundaries.
• Capable of producing similar size earthquakes M_W 7+.
• Tsunami in the the Bay of Izmit.

Comparison of Earthquakes

Chi-Chi earthquake

• Eight M_W 6.0 to 6.8 aftershocks have occurred within two months of the main shock.
• 46,700 buildings totally collapsed .
• Over 2,400 persons were killed.
• 100,000 persons homeless.
• No Alquist-Priolo or Field Act equivalent for either Country.

Kocaeli earthquake

• One M_W 6.5 earthquake approximately 30 seconds after the start of the Kocaeli earthquake.
• Over 220,000 structures were destroyed
• Over 18,000 persons were killed.
• 250,000 persons homeless.

Fiscal Impacts

Due to the difference in construction, cost per square foot, and affected businesses and industries a direct cost comparison is not possible. Direct and indirect losses associated with the Kocaeli earthquake was $16 billion. Direct and indirect losses associated with the Chi-Chi earthquake was $30 billion.

Direct and indirect losses associated with the Northridge, California and Kobe, Japan earthquake was $25 billion and $100 billion respectively.

It should be noted that both Turkey and Taiwan have modern building codes. However, enforcement and application of the building codes in Turkey and Taiwan were found to be significantly lacking. Turkish government was criticized for being slow to respond. Taiwanese government reacted swiftly.

Waste Management

Some of the disaster debris in Turkey were landfilled into the Marmara Sea, while others were disposed of in canyons or existing landfills. There is a distinct lack of class III municipal solid waste landfills in the region affected by the earthquake although class III type landfills are being built in Turkey.

Some of the landfill disaster debris along the Marmara Sea coast will be utilized as made land with unknown use at the time of the field reconnaissance. None of the disaster debris fill was processed as to be useful as an engineered fill meeting Turkish or American engineered fill requirements.

In Taiwan there appeared to be a distinct effort to separate some of the concrete and re-bar from the rest of the disaster debris. This led to areas that contained (less than 1 to 8 hectares) of somewhat processed concrete and re-bar. In some areas along the highways there are areas where re-bar and car bodies are stacked over 6 meters high in small lots. Typically municipal solid waste is incinerated instead of landfilled.

Landfill Performance and Fault Rupture

A class III type canyon-fill landfill in Wu Feng, Taiwan (Wu-Feng Landfill) was damaged by fault rupture along the Cherlungpu fault.

• HDPE lined landfill.
• No significant landfill gas monitoring or control systems.
• Front fill slope approximately 2:1 (horizontal to vertical).
• The toe of the fill slope was deformed and displaced by surface rupture associated with the Cherlungpu fault zone but did not catastrophically fail.
• The estimated peak horizontal ground acceleration was 0.6 g.
• No report of rain induced movement in fill slope.
• Minor landslides over liner apparent in the upslope side of landfill but liner was not known to be compromised.
• Landfill is operating.

Yalova Landfill Performance Notes

• Landfill is located approximately 3 km east of Yalova (about 14 km southwest of Kocaeli earthquake epicenter). 
• The site was not ruptured by the North Anatolian fault or secondary faults.
• Site is an unlined side-hill area fill landfill with a 1.75:1 (horizontal to vertical) slide slope, approximately 16 meters high. Waste is covered with silty sand (local soils).
• No landfill gas or ground water monitoring and control systems apparent.
• Estimated peak horizontal ground acceleration was 0.2 g.
• No apparent earthquake related damage to landfill based upon limited observations from entry area of landfill site.
• Landfill was in operation.

Wu Feng Transfer Station

• Transfer station was hit by the surface rupture of the Cherlungpu fault near Wu Feng, Taiwan.
• The estimated peak horizontal ground acceleration was 0.4 g.
• Transfer station was and is unattended.
• The transfer station did not possess a drainage system that retained surface water run-off. Surface water made its way to the near by Grass-Lake Creek.
• Trash and litter prevalent outside and near the transfer station.
• Many wild or lost dogs in rural parts of earthquake affected area.

Adapazari Disposal Site

• Located north of Adapazari near the shore of the Sakaya River.
• Site geology is made up of young flood plain deposits and quaternary alluvium.
• The estimated peak horizontal ground acceleration was 0.4 g.
• Combination unattended area fill/burn dump with no liners or environmental monitoring control systems.
• Liquefaction and lateral spreading near site prominent but did not appear to encroach on disposal site as seen during aerial reconnaissance. (May not have made any difference even if it did).
• No apparent damage, site was in use during reconnaissance.

Disaster Recovery

• Light rain fell in the vicinity of the earthquake affected area around the Marmara Sea for several days.
• In order to prevent the spread of disease entire buildings were covered with disinfectants and lime.
• Dust masks and gloves were recommended by local health authorities while conducting damage assessment in Adapazari.
• Not all persons were recovered from downed buildings while the buildings were demolished and their debris landfilled into the sea or canyons.
• Mass graves used in Turkey. Photos were taken of casualties in the hopes that they could later be identified.

Emergency Housing

• Large scale tent cities built in Turkey in areas damaged by earthquake.
• Empty (new) housing in Istanbul, and in the area affected by the earthquake were left empty.
• Temporary housing erected with concrete foundations and underground sprinkler systems.
• Taiwanese government allocated loss funds for deceased family members.
• No significant relief from mortgage payments in Taiwan.
• Many families in Turkey spent the winter in tents donated by various relief organizations and the Turkish Red Crescent organization.

Transportation Systems

One bridge was downed as a result of fault rupture and strong ground shaking in the Kocaeli earthquake. Railroad tracks were distorted but repaired within 48 hours of the earthquake.

Eleven bridges were downed as a result of either strong ground shaking or fault rupture or both in Taiwan. Key bridge routes were temporarily replaced within 48 hours of the Chi-Chi earthquake. Railroad tracks near Meing-lao were still down two months after the earthquake.

The naval yard at Golcuck was heavily damaged due to dynamic compaction and down dropping of coast in the Marmara Sea. Minor damage to Taichung Harbor from liquefaction did not seriously hamper use of the harbor.

No significant damage was reported to airfields after either earthquake.

Electric System Performance

Kocaeli earthquake

• Generation capacity off-line but quickly restored.
• Transmission grid rerouted so that service was restored within a few hours in large areas damaged by the earthquake.
• Distribution damage to transformers.
• Delay in energizing distribution system asked for in order to assess and mitigate potential for electrically ignited fires.

Chi-Chi earthquake

• Generation capacity off-line but quickly restored.
• Transmission grid between north and south disrupted. Power fluctuation problem for about a month after earthquake.
• Significant damage due to landslides damaging switchyard and transmission line towers.
• Distribution system damage adversely affected computer chip facilities.

Water Systems

Seven dams were in the vicinity of the Kocaeli (four), Chi-Chi (three) areas of strong ground shaking.

One concrete diversion dam (Shih Kan Dam) was breached and displaced up to 7.5 meters vertically by fault rupture through the dam.

The Izmit Water Project was on line and experienced a 2 meter seiche in a large reservoir near Izmit and a loss of power at the pumping stations and water treatment plant. The project was on-line within two to six days of the earthquake.

Waste water treatment plant in Izmit was off-line due to damage to feeder lines as of September 9, 1999.

A sewer line was displaced 3 meters and leaked sewage into Lake Sapanca (health hazard).

The potable water distribution system in Adapazari was destroyed by liquefaction related ground deformation.

Aftershocks and Additional Earthquakes

Over 2,400 aftershocks associated with the Kocaeli earthquake.

November 12, 1999 a M_W 7.2 earthquake occurred near the eastern end of the Kocaeli earthquake rupture zone. This earthquake may have been triggered by the loading of additional stress on the North Anatolian fault caused by the Kocaeli earthquake.

Stein, et al., 1997, estimated that there is a 13% chance of a magnitude 7+ earthquake occurring on the North Anatolian fault in the Marmara Sea just south of Istanbul by 2026. The Kocaeli earthquake was not the earthquake estimated by Stein et al.

Over 10,000 aftershocks have occurred in the vicinity of the Cherlungpu fault rupture zone. Several moderate earthquakes have occurred east of the rupture zone causing minor damage and loss of life.

Lessons Learned

Building codes are useless if not followed. Poor construction practice leads to poor building and infrastructure performance.

The amount of damage to buildings built on sites with poor soil conditions, without considering site geologic conditions was not unexpected.

The key to helping communities withstand large earthquakes is education and communication.

Customs as well as laws need to be changed so that building officials can be made less likely to not enforce building code requirements.

Insurance and lending companies may need to get involved in helping entice building code compliance via incentives in rate schedules.

Conclusions

One major performance issue was the lack of redundancy in the Taiwanese power transmission system, whereas the Turkish power transmission system was highly redundant. These two aspects were reflected in the ability of each power company to resume transmission of high voltage electric service to their customers over wide areas.

Choke points in California electric transmission system may lead to significant economic hardship due to business interruption.

Response time by government officials may be tied into the collection of data with respect to time, location, size and areas affected by the earthquakes.

Disaster debris management approaches were different than those followed after the Northridge earthquake. (More on Northridge earthquake debris management...)

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